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Eyewitness error is one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions. In fact, the Amer-
ican Psychological Association estimates that one in three eyewitnesses make an erro-
neous identification. In this review, we look briefly at some of the causes of eyewitness
error. We examine what jurors, judges, attorneys, law officers, and experts from various
countries know about eyewitness testimony and memory, and if they have the requisite
knowledge and skills to accurately assess eyewitness testimony. We evaluate whether
legal safeguards such as voir dire, motion-to-suppress an identification, cross-examination,
jury instructions, and eyewitness expert testimony are effective in identifying eyewitness
errors. Lastly, we discuss solutions to eyewitness error.
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Researchers have been studying eyewitness testimony for over
a century because of the frailties of human memory and the
important role that it plays in wrongful convictions. Memory is a
reconstructive process (1). Accordingly, post-event information
supplied by the police, prosecutors, media, other eyewitnesses,
family, and friends can alter not only an eyewitness’s memory
of the crime but also the eyewitness’s memory of the perpetrator
of the crime (2). For example, law officers can alter an eyewit-
ness memory of the perpetrator by asking leading questions such
as: “Did the perpetrator have blond hair?” Eyewitnesses are gen-
erally unaware that their memory of the crime or perpetrator
has been altered by post-event information. Moreover, once an
eyewitness memory is altered, it will be very difficult if not impos-
sible to restore the eyewitness’s original memory of the crime or
perpetrator (3).
Not only is eyewitness memory malleable, but so is eyewitness
confidence. Many factors such as repeated questioning of eyewit-
ness, confirming feedback (e.g., “Good, you have identified the
suspect!”), and learning that another eyewitness has identified the
same suspect can increase eyewitness confidence but not his or
her accuracy. Because eyewitness confidence is generally the most
important factor that the trier of fact uses in evaluating eyewitness
accuracy, increases in eyewitness confidence can cause wrongful
convictions (4). Factors that increase eyewitness confidence have
their greatest effect on an eyewitness’s confidence for inaccurate
information (5, 6).
Eyewitness error is a leading cause of wrongful convictions.
For instance, eyewitness error was involved in about 75% of the
312 DNA exonerations cases in the U.S. (7). Gross and Shaffer (8)
conducted a detailed analysis of 873 cases in the National Registry
of Exonerations, a joint project of Michigan’s and Northwestern’s
law schools, and determined that eyewitness misidentifications
occurred in 667 (76%) cases. Smith and Cutler (9) analyzed
1198 cases of wrongful conviction and considered other factors
relevant to the causes of wrongful convictions. They concluded
“that about 50% of the cases of conviction of the innocent involved
mistaken identification” (p. 11). Moreover, the American Psy-
chological Association estimates that about one of every three
eyewitnesses makes an erroneous identification (10).
In the following sections of this review, we examine what the
principal participants in the criminal justice system and experts
know about eyewitness testimony and memory, how effective legal
safeguards are in detecting eyewitness error, and solutions that
legal systems can implement to minimize eyewitness error.
WHAT THE PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS AND EXPERTS KNOW ABOUT EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY AND MEMORY
JURORS
If eyewitness error is going to be minimized, jurors and legal pro-
fessionals must be knowledgeable about eyewitness factors and
capable of applying them to the facts of a case. Studies of jurors
and potential jurors in several different countries indicate that they
have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors, though the extent of
their knowledge varies, depending on the nature of the questions
asked [(11) (U.S.); (12) (U.S.); (13) (Canada); (14) (Scotland); (15)
(Norway); (16) (Australia); (17) (UK); (18) (U.S.)]. Furthermore,
in assessing accuracy, jurors generally rely on factors that are poor
predictors of accuracy, such as eyewitness confidence at trial, mem-
ory for minor details, and consistency of eyewitness testimony.
Jurors also tend to ignore factors that are good predictors of
accuracy, such as whether the eyewitness wore a disguise, used a
weapon, and most importantly the system variables in the case
(19–21). System variables are eyewitness factors that generally

























































Wise et al. Causes and solutions to eyewitness error
the criminal justice system can control such as how the police
conducted the eyewitness interviews and the identification pro-
cedures. Estimator variables are factors that cannot be controlled
such as the lighting at the crime scene and whether the perpetrator
wore a disguise (22). Lastly, jurors have trouble integrating their
knowledge of eyewitness factors into the facts of a criminal case
(23–26). Consequently, even if jurors were knowledgeable about
eyewitness factors, they would still have difficulty assessing eyewit-
ness accuracy. This result would likely occur because jurors would
have problems applying their knowledge to the facts of a case.
JUDGES
Psychologists have also studied what legal professionals and
experts know about eyewitness testimony and memory. For exam-
ple, Wise and Safer (27) surveyed 160 U.S. judges to determine
their knowledge about eyewitness testimony, what they believe
jurors know about eyewitness testimony, and what legal safeguards
they would permit attorneys to use to educate jurors about eyewit-
ness testimony. Eight of the questions in their survey were the same
or similar to questions in a survey of eyewitness experts by Kassin
et al. (28). The U.S. judges in the survey averaged only 55% correct
on the 14-item knowledge scale. Moreover, many of the judges did
not know key facts about eyewitness testimony such as the weak
relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy at trial1,
the important role that eyewitness error plays in wrongful convic-
tions, and the difficulty jurors have in differentiating accurate and
inaccurate eyewitnesses.
The U.S. judges’ responses differed significantly from the eye-
witness experts’ responses on five of eight questions where they
answered the same or similar questions. Compared to the eyewit-
ness experts, the judges were more likely to believe that jurors were
knowledgeable about eyewitness testimony. The judges in the sur-
vey were reluctant to permit the use of expert testimony to educate
jurors about eyewitness testimony. Years of experience as an attor-
ney or judge were not related to judges’ knowledge of eyewitness
factors. In contrast, judges in the survey who were more knowl-
edgeable about eyewitness testimony had many of the attitudes
and beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. For
example, they believed jurors have limited knowledge of eyewit-
ness factors. They also had a greater willingness to permit the use
of legal safeguards for eyewitness error including expert testimony.
Judges’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony has been assessed in
other countries. For instance, Magnussen et al. (29) used a modi-
fied version of the Wise and Safer questionnaire to determine what
157 Norwegian judges knew about eyewitness testimony and com-
pared their responses to the responses of the U.S. judges and the
eyewitness experts of Kassin et al. (28). They found that the Nor-
wegian judges’ responses were similar to the U.S. judges’ responses
1In both the U.S. and the Norwegian survey of judges, approximately one-third of
the judges thought that at trial eyewitness confidence is related to accuracy, one-
third thought that it is not related to accuracy, and one-third did not know. These
results suggest that generally judges are unaware that at trial, eyewitness confidence
is a poor predictor of accuracy. This finding is particularly troubling because as
previously stated eyewitness confidence is the most important factor the trier of fact
generally uses in evaluating eyewitness accuracy. Accordingly, because of their lack
of knowledge, judges are unlikely to correct jurors’ erroneous belief that eyewitness
confidence at trial predicts accuracy.
though they knew somewhat more about eyewitness testimony
than the U.S. judges (63% correct vs. 55% correct).
As was true of the U.S. judges, the Norwegian judges knew
significantly less about eyewitness testimony than the eyewitness
experts and were less skeptical of jurors’ knowledge of eyewitness
testimony than the experts. Similarly to the U.S. judges, Norwegian
judges’ knowledge was not related to legal or judicial experience.
Like the U.S. judges, greater knowledge of eyewitness testimony for
the Norwegian judges was related to beliefs and attitudes that may
be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. Other surveys of judges
have produced similar results [(11, 30) (Swedish judges); (14)
(Scottish judges); (31) (Chinese judges)]. Furthermore, it appears
judges, like jurors, have difficulty integrating their knowledge of
eyewitness testimony into the facts of a criminal case (32).
PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
A few studies have examined what defense attorneys and pros-
ecutors know about eyewitness testimony. Most of these studies
are out-of-date (33–36). There are, however, two recent surveys of
attorneys’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Wise et al. (37) sur-
veyed 73 prosecutors and 1184 defense attorneys in the U.S. about
their knowledge of a wide array of estimator and system variables.
The prosecutors averaged only 47% correct on the 13-item knowl-
edge scale compared to 78% correct for the defense attorneys.
The defense attorneys’ superior performance, however, appeared
to result in part from their greater skepticism about eyewitness
accuracy rather than their greater knowledge.
The prosecutors, compared to the defense attorneys, believed
that jurors know significantly more about eyewitness testimony.
The prosecutors were also significantly more likely than the
defense attorneys to think that eyewitness testimony is reliable
and were significantly less likely than the defense attorneys to
believe that eyewitness error is a major factor in wrongful con-
victions. The prosecutors were significantly less willing than the
defense attorneys to permit the use of legal safeguards to educate
jurors about eyewitness testimony, including eyewitness expert
testimony. Moreover, like the judges, attorneys’ knowledge of eye-
witness testimony was not related to legal experience, but was
related to attitudes and beliefs that may be necessary to reduce
eyewitness error.
In another recent survey, Magnussen et al. (38) evaluated what
100 Italian defense attorneys know about eyewitness testimony.
The Italian defense attorneys averaged 71% correct on a 12-item
knowledge scale. Similar to the results reported in the survey of the
U.S. defense attorneys, the Italian defense attorneys’ superior per-
formance appeared to result at least in part from their greater skep-
ticism of eyewitness testimony rather than their greater knowledge.
Like prior surveys of legal professionals, greater knowledge for the
Italian defense attorneys was not related to legal experience but
was related to attitudes and beliefs that may be necessary to reduce
eyewitness error. Finally, as was true of jurors and judges, attorneys
appear to have difficulty applying their knowledge of eyewitness
factors to the facts of a case (32).
LAW OFFICERS
If legal systems are going to minimize eyewitness error, law offi-
cers must identify the relevant eyewitness factors at the crime

























































Wise et al. Causes and solutions to eyewitness error
scene and conduct proper eyewitness interviews and identifica-
tion procedures. Moreover, because memory is a reconstructive
process, once law officers conduct a biased eyewitness interview or
identification procedure they generally cannot correct their errors
by subsequently conducting proper procedures (39).
In 1999, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”), the research
arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, published Eyewitness Evi-
dence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (“Guide”). The Guide con-
tained recommended procedures for U.S. law (40) enforcement
agencies for conducting eyewitness interviews and identification
procedures. The Guide was heavily based on scientific research on
eyewitness testimony. In 2003, NIJ published Eyewitness Evidence:
A Training Manual for Law Enforcement (“Training Manual”)
(41), which provided training in the Guide’s procedures for law
enforcement agencies.
Surveys of law officers in various countries show that they
have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors [(11) (U.S.); (42)
(Canada); (30) (Sweden); (43) (Estonia); (39) (U.S.)]. For exam-
ple, Wise et al. (39) surveyed 532 U.S. law officers. Their sample
included 83 officers from jurisdictions that had implemented eye-
witness reforms, and 449 officers from jurisdictions that had not
implemented eyewitness reforms. The reform officers averaged
6.11 (56%) correct on the 11-item knowledge scale about eyewit-
ness factors while the non-reformed officers averaged 52% (5.68)
correct answers. Similarly in the survey by Fraser et al. (42) of 168
Canadian law officers, they averaged 8.55 (61.1%) correct answers
on the survey’s 14-item knowledge scale about eyewitness factors.
Wise et al. (39) also found that both the reform officers and
the non-reform officers failed to follow many of the Guide’s pro-
cedures for conducting eyewitness interviews, photo lineups, and
show-ups. Of the 17 Guide procedures in their survey for con-
ducting eyewitness interviews, lineups, and show-ups, the reform
officers reported following on average only 12.21 (72%) of the
procedures. The non-reform officers reported following on aver-
age, only 11.06 (65%) of the Guide’s procedures. Moreover, only
18% of the reform officers and only 1% of the non-reform officers
in the survey had both read the Guide and received training in its
procedures.
The Police Executive Research Forum (44) conducted the first
nationwide assessment of how U.S. law enforcement agencies con-
duct identification procedures. The survey showed that U.S. law
enforcement agencies lack uniformity in their identification pro-
cedures and that most agencies have not fully implemented the
Guide’s procedures. In fact, some Guide procedures have been
implemented in less than half of the agencies, and the major-
ity of the U.S. law enforcement agencies still use non-blind,
simultaneous lineup procedures.
EXPERT WITNESSES
Magnussen and Melinder (45, 46) surveyed 858 licensed Nor-
wegian psychologists about their knowledge and beliefs about
memory. Their results were compared to prior surveys of legal
professionals and lay persons and to scientific studies of memory.
The psychologists were no more knowledgeable about eyewitness
memory than judges or lay persons, and a substantial minority
of the psychologists had scientifically unsupported beliefs about
memory. In a follow-up study, Melinder and Magnussen (47)
determined if 115 Norwegian psychiatrists and psychologists who
had testified as expert witnesses in court were more knowledgeable
about memory than 819 Norwegian psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists who had never been an expert witness. Contrary to their
expectations, the psychiatrists and psychologists who testified as
expert witnesses were no more knowledgeable about memory than
the psychiatrists and psychologists who had never been an expert
witness.
This survey also included a few questions about memory that
are not only relevant to criminal cases but also to the practice
of psychiatry and psychology. These questions asked respondents
how young children’s memory compares to adult memory, how
memory for traumatic events compares to memory for mundane
events, and whether childhood and adult traumatic experiences
can be repressed. Accordingly, the questions covered information
that psychiatrists and psychologists should know about mem-
ory, even if they do not testify as expert witnesses. Once again,
a substantial minority of the psychiatrists and psychologists,
including those who testified as expert witnesses, had scientifi-
cally unsupported beliefs about memory. Mirandola et al. (48)
reported very similar results when they surveyed psychology stu-
dents and psychology professors at a major Italian university. A
recent study showed that many U.S. psychologists also have sci-
entifically unsupported beliefs about memory (49). Melinder and
Magnussen (47) concluded from their surveys that expert wit-
nesses are at risk of providing courts with faulty information about
memory.
CONCLUSION
The principal participants in criminal justice systems appear to
have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors. Moreover, it is likely
that surveys overestimate their knowledge. Surveys focus respon-
dents’ attention on the relevant eyewitness factors, only require
respondents to recognize rather than generate the correct answer,
and usually do not take guessing into account. For example, Hous-
ton et al. (14) determined that jury eligible participants produced
significantly more correct answers when they completed a multi-
ple choice questionnaire about eyewitness factors than when they
had to produce their own responses to questions.
Alonzo and Lane (50) found that respondents’ answers to
surveys about eyewitness factors did not predict how they
assessed eyewitness accuracy. This result is not surprising. As
previously stated, research shows that the principal participants
in criminal justice systems have trouble applying their knowl-
edge of eyewitness factors to the facts of a case. Consequently,
even if they were knowledgeable about eyewitness factors, they
would probably still have problems assessing eyewitness accu-
racy. As Cutler and Penrod (51) stated, even experts have dif-
ficulty integrating their knowledge into the facts of a case. In
sum, legal systems should be alarmed that not only jurors, but
legal professionals and even many experts appear to lack the
necessary knowledge and skills to accurately assess eyewitness
testimony.
LEGAL SAFEGUARDS
Because the principal participants in criminal justice systems lack
the requisite knowledge and skills to accurately assess eyewitness
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testimony, legal systems need safeguards that either prevent erro-
neous eyewitness identifications from being introduced into evi-
dence at trial or enable the trier of fact to accurately assess eyewit-
ness testimony. The U.S. legal system employs several safeguards
in attempting to achieve these vital goals.
MOTION-TO-SUPPRESS AN IDENTIFICATION
A defense attorney in the U.S. can file a motion-to-suppress an
identification to prevent a suggestive identification from being
introduced at trial. For a motion-to-suppress to be an effective
safeguard, several requirements must be met. First, defense attor-
neys must be present at identification procedures so they can
determine if they were suggestive. Second, attorneys and judges
must know the factors that cause suggestive identification proce-
dures. Third, they must be capable of applying their knowledge to
identification procedures.
Defense attorneys are usually not present at identification pro-
cedures in the U.S. because photo arrays are primarily used for
identifications rather than live lineups (52). In the U.S., there is
no right to have an attorney present at a photo array even after
an indictment (53). In addition, as was previously stated, attorney
and judges have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors and have
difficulty applying them to the facts of a case.
VOIR DIRE
Voir dire is the process of selecting a jury in the U.S. If attorneys can
select jurors who will critically and carefully evaluate eyewitness
testimony, voir dire could be an effective remedy for eyewitness
error. For voir dire to be an effective legal safeguard, two require-
ments must be met. Attorneys must have sufficient opportunity
to assess potential jurors’ attitudes and beliefs about eyewitness
testimony during voir dire. Second, attorneys must be capable of
making these assessments (52). In some U.S. courts, attorneys can
extensively question potential jurors. In other courts, attorneys’
questioning of potential jurors is very limited or may even be
non-existent.
Narby and Cutler (54) developed the Attitudes to Eyewit-
ness Scale to assess jurors’ attitudes and beliefs about eyewitness
testimony. It was successful in only one of three studies in predict-
ing how mock jurors assess eyewitness testimony (52). In short,
because attorneys’ lack the opportunity in many U.S. courts to
assess jurors’ attitudes and beliefs about eyewitness testimony and
because they lack a valid instrument for assessing them, it does not
appear that voir dire is an effective remedy for eyewitness error.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
For cross-examination to be an effective safeguard, three condi-
tions must be met. First, attorneys must be knowledgeable about
eyewitness factors so they can identify for jurors during cross-
examination the factors that indicate that the eyewitness may have
made an erroneous identification. Second, jurors must be knowl-
edgeable about eyewitness factors so they can comprehend the
significance of the cross-examination. Lastly, jurors must be capa-
ble of applying the relevant eyewitness factors revealed during
cross-examination to the facts of a case (52). As previously dis-
cussed, attorneys and jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness
factors, and they have difficulty applying their knowledge to the
facts of a case.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Because of the ineffectiveness of other safeguards, many scholars
recommend that courts use jury instructions or expert testimony
to sensitize jurors to eyewitness testimony. Unfortunately, the lim-
ited research conducted on jury instructions shows that they do
not protect against eyewitness error. Several studies tested the
Telfaire jury instructions. The Telfaire instructions are eyewit-
ness jury instructions that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia created in Telfaire (55). The Telfaire instruc-
tions are the most widely used eyewitness jury instructions in the
U.S (56, 57). The Telfaire instructions include five factors that
jurors should consider when evaluating eyewitness accuracy and
are based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Biggers (58)
and Braithwaite (59)2.
Studies of the Telfaire instructions uniformly show that they
do not sensitize jurors to eyewitness testimony (56, 57, 60, 61).
Because of their ineffectiveness, psychologists have attempted to
improve them. For example, Greene (57) simplified and clarified
the Telfaire instructions. She also added to the Telfaire instruc-
tions information about the effects of certain eyewitness factors on
accuracy such as eyewitness confidence, stress, and the retention
interval. Greene found that her revised eyewitness instructions
increased mock-juror skepticism, but did not increase their sen-
sitivity to eyewitness testimony. Ramirez et al. (61) also tried to
enhance their effectiveness by simplifying them and including 13
eyewitness factors that commonly affect eyewitness accuracy. The
revised instructions failed to increase mock-jurors’ sensitivity to
eyewitness testimony.
Bornstein and Hamm (56) tried various means to increase
the efficacy of eyewitness jury instructions. They simplified and
modified them to include specific factors relevant to accuracy.
They provided mock jurors with written jury instructions as well
as verbal instructions. They manipulated the judge’s demeanor
when presenting the jury instructions and created interactive jury
instructions. None of their modifications increased jurors’ sensi-
tivity. They concluded:“. . . the research on modifying instructions
about witness identification has generally failed to accomplish this
goal [of sensitizing jurors], and the present studies do not afford a
much more optimistic conclusion”(p. 53). Lastly, jury instructions
from Henderson (62), which are based on eyewitness research, are
also ineffective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness testimony (63).
EYEWITNESS EXPERT TESTIMONY
Cutler et al. (64) stated that eyewitness expert testimony can pro-
duce three effects: (1) no effect because the trier of fact does not
understand the expert testimony or is not persuaded by it; (2)
enhanced skepticism, which causes the trier of fact to disbelieve
all eyewitnesses no matter how good the eyewitness conditions;
and (3) enhanced sensitivity, which educates the trier of fact about
eyewitness factors and how to apply them to the facts of the case.
2The five eyewitness factors discussed in the Telfaire instructions are: (1) the qual-
ity of the eyewitness’ view of the perpetrator of the crime; (2) the time between
the crime and the identification procedure; (3) the eyewitness’s confidence in the
accuracy of the identification; (4) the accuracy of the eyewitness’ description of the
perpetrator; and (5) the degree of attention the eyewitness paid to the crime. These
factors have limited utility in assessing eyewitness accuracy (76).

























































Wise et al. Causes and solutions to eyewitness error
Clearly, the desirable effect of expert testimony or any other legal
safeguard is to increase the trier of fact’s sensitivity to eyewitness
testimony.
The most common effect of eyewitness expert testimony is to
increase jurors’ skepticism of eyewitnesses. For example, Leippe
and his colleagues have summarized on several occasions the lit-
erature on eyewitness expert testimony (65–67). In their most
recent summary, they divided the research on eyewitness expert
testimony into two categories: studies prior to 1995 and studies
after 1995 (66). They found 12 studies of expert testimony prior
to 1995. In 10 of the 12 studies, expert testimony increased juror
skepticism. In reviewing eight of these studies, where it could be
evaluated if expert testimony increased juror sensitivity to eyewit-
ness factors, they found that only two studies increase sensitivity.
They concluded: “Sensitivity appeared to be more the exception
than the rule” (p. 176).
Leippe and Eisenstadt (66) discussed seven additional studies of
eyewitness expert testimony that were conducted after 1995. These
studies further demonstrated the difficulty that expert testimony
has in sensitizing the trier of fact to eyewitness factors. In the lat-
est study of eyewitness expert testimony, Martire and Kemp (68)
determined if it could sensitize participants to the relationship
between eyewitness confidence and accuracy. They found that,
though the participants seemed to understand what the expert said
about the relationship between eyewitness confidence and accu-
racy, they did not integrate their knowledge into their assessments
of eyewitness accuracy. In sum, there is no consistently effective
legal safeguard for eyewitness error.
SOLUTIONS TO EYEWITNESS ERROR
EDUCATION
Because the principal participants in criminal justice systems have
limited knowledge of eyewitness factors, it is essential that legal
systems educate them about eyewitnesses. Law schools should
teach law students about eyewitnesses. For example, law courses
such as criminal law and criminal procedure could include in-
depth information about the different types of eyewitness error,
the causes of eyewitness error, and the legal safeguards needed to
minimize eyewitness error. Judges’ and attorneys’ training should
include extensive instruction about eyewitnesses. Law enforce-
ment agencies need to incorporate detailed information about
eyewitnesses when they train law officers. Professional organiza-
tions should offer courses about eyewitnesses for psychologists
and psychiatrists who testify about it.
Moreover, psychologists who conduct research on eyewitness
testimony should be knowledgeable about criminal investiga-
tions and trials so their recommendations for eyewitness reforms
comport with the realities of a criminal justice system. Wilford
and Wells (69) cite examples of impractical reforms eyewitness
researchers have proposed. For instance, some researchers recom-
mend that law enforcement agencies do not use show-ups because
they are more suggestive than lineups. In fact, show-ups are essen-
tial to U.S. law enforcement because they allow law officers to arrest
suspects shortly after a crime.
Courts could provide information about eyewitnesses to poten-
tial jurors who may hear criminal cases. Furthermore, legal profes-
sionals and experts need periodic refresher courses to keep them
informed about the latest developments in eyewitness research.
Legislation mandating that legal professionals receive eyewitness
training may be the most effective means to accomplish this
essential goal.
As previously stated, accurate assessment of eyewitness accu-
racy requires both knowledge of eyewitness factors and the ability
to apply them to the facts of the case. Accordingly, courses for
legal professionals, psychiatrists, and psychologists should not only
educate them about memory, eyewitness factors, and proper pro-
cedures for eyewitness interviews and identification procedures;
but also teach them how to integrate their knowledge into the
facts of a case. Because of their expertise in eyewitness testimony
and assessment, psychologists should work with legal professionals
to develop courses about eyewitnesses and help legal professionals
assess the courses’ reliability and validity.
PROPER EYEWITNESS INTERVIEWS AND IDENTIFICATIONS
The most potent means available to the legal system to reduce
eyewitness error is to conduct proper eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures. It is much easier to prevent eyewit-
ness errors than to detect them once they have occurred (69). We
have seen, however, that despite NIJ promulgating the Guide and
Training Manual, U.S. law enforcement agencies have been slow in
adapting eyewitness reforms that are necessary for proper proce-
dures. Moreover, law enforcement must stay informed about new
research on proper procedures. This means law enforcement needs
to regularly review their procedures for eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures to determine if they need revision.
Because conducting proper eyewitness interviews and identi-
fication procedures is essential to reducing eyewitness error, legal
systems should view eyewitness evidence as a type of trace evi-
dence, like DNA or blood evidence (70). Consequently, the use
of scientific procedures in producing eyewitness evidence should
be an important factor in determining whether eyewitness evi-
dence is admitted in criminal cases. In addition, like other types
of trace evidence, legal systems should generally require law offi-
cers who collect eyewitness evidence to be trained and certified
in scientific procedures for conducting eyewitness interviews and
identification procedures.
More pressure needs to be exerted on legal systems to insti-
tute proper eyewitness interviews and identification procedures.
Potential sources of influence on legal systems to implement
proper procedures include legislation, court decisions, expert tes-
timony, and media attention about the problem of eyewitness
error (69).
IMPROVED LEGAL SAFEGUARDS
Even if law enforcement adapted all the necessary reforms for
proper interviews and identification procedures, eyewitness errors
would still occur. As we have seen, legal professionals and jurors
have difficulty assessing eyewitness accuracy and currently no legal
safeguard consistently sensitizes the trier of fact to eyewitness fac-
tors. Accordingly, if legal systems are going to minimize eyewitness
error, they must develop an effective safeguard for identifying it.
To address this problem, Wise created the interview-
identification-eyewitness factor (I-I-Eye) method for analyzing
eyewitness accuracy (71, 72). The I-I-Eye method consists of four
steps: first, you determine if law officers (a) conducted the eye-
witness interviews so they obtained the maximum amount of
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accurate information, (b) did not contaminate the eyewitness’s
memory of the crime with post-event information, or (c) arti-
ficially increased the eyewitness’s confidence. In the second step,
you assess if the identification procedures in the case were properly
conducted. During the third step, you evaluate how the eyewitness
factors during the crime likely affected eyewitness’s accuracy. In
the fourth step, you make conclusions about the likely accuracy of
the eyewitness testimony in the case.
Three studies testing the I-I-Eye method showed that it sen-
sitizes jurors to eyewitness testimony [(21, 73); Wise and Kehn
(under review)]. Although the results so far have been encourag-
ing, much more research is needed before it can be concluded that
I-I-Eye method is an effective safeguard for eyewitness error.
As was previously discussed, there has been limited research
on improving legal safeguards. Developing effective legal safe-
guards for detecting eyewitness error should be a top priority for
eyewitness researchers and legal professionals.
GREATER COOPERATION WITH LEGAL PROFESSIONALS AND MORE
FIELD STUDIES OF EYEWITNESS REFORMS
Psychologists should work closely with legal professionals in devel-
oping and testing eyewitness reforms. Legal professionals have
expertise, knowledge, and experience that psychologists lack, and
their skills and knowledge are essential to creating effective reforms
that have strong ecological validity. Furthermore, legal profes-
sionals must deal with the adverse consequences of eyewitness
reforms such as administrative difficulties in implementing them,
increased costs, and fewer accurate eyewitness identifications.
Therefore, it is vital that legal professionals are involved in devel-
oping and testing eyewitness reforms so they are motivated to
successfully implement them despite their problems.
Many law officers, prosecutors, and even some judges view eye-
witness reforms with suspicion because they believe that they only
benefit the defense, will primarily result in guilty defendants going
free, and do not take into account the realities of a criminal justice
system. Accordingly, psychologists need to do a better job of edu-
cating legal professionals how reforms can benefit them (69). For
example, conducting proper eyewitness interviews and identifica-
tion procedures substantially strengthen prosecutors’ cases, help
alleviate increasing juror concerns about the reliability of eyewit-
ness testimony, and reduce defendants’ use of eyewitness expert
testimony.
Psychologists should also conduct more field studies to ensure
that eyewitness reforms have strong ecological validity. The Hen-
nepin County’s blind sequential pilot project (74) and the Greens-
boro Protocol (75) are excellent examples of well-conducted field
studies about eyewitness testimony. They also demonstrate the
great progress that can be made in eyewitness research when
psychologists and legal professionals work together to reduce
eyewitness error.
CONCLUSION
Wrongful convictions are not only a tragedy for innocent defen-
dants and their families but also for the victims of additional
crimes that occur because the true perpetrator of a crime has
not been apprehended. Moreover, wrongful convictions under-
mine the public’s faith in the law especially when the wrongful
convictions are preventable (27). The solutions discussed above
could help to significantly reduce eyewitness error and the
wrongful convictions that result from them.
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